“The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.”
So goes a famous quote often attributed to the original Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin. Watching Inside Job, this year’s Academy Award documentary winner, I was struck by the sense the film gives of profit and greed as forces so strong, they defy even self preservation.
Of course in the United States, we have apparatus like the SEC and the Treasury Department that are supposed to prevent or head off systemic instability that could threaten Wall Street, not to mention the entire economy.
In 2008, the country learned in terrifying fashion that such oversight wasn’t enough. Explanations have since swirled what exactly stemmed the crisis and how it could become so severe.
One popular conceit is that the financial system and the grave problems that began to fester within it became so complex, they simply eluded regulation and even the grasp of the very Wall Street firms that created them. Financial companies had spun a labyrinthine world of unforeseeable interconnectedness; companies became too big to fail because the products and services they provided bore too much of an impact on the health of other firms. If the government for instance would have let AIG go under, the countless insurance products it had placed throughout the financial system would be immediately worthless, leading to chaos and dealing a potential deathblow to other firms, like a line of dominoes falling one after the other.
It was as if the economy was a vast game of chess that somehow, in the heat of the action, had catastrophically aligned in a surprise checkmate.
Right leaning pundits will fault the government for trying to drive up home ownership through a host of programs and by allowing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to expand their mortgage lending activities. Such policies, these people say, ended up inflating the value of the housing market and enabled home buyers who had neither the financial wherewithal nor the proven fiscal responsibility to take on such an investment. Other economists will point to Americans, living high during the economic boom, as all too complicit in the rollback of credit restrictions, leveraging themselves to the hilt to draw increasing sums of disposable cash from the swelling value of their homes in order to fuel needless spending. While it’s alarming to think of the Wall Street firms who were securitizing bad mortgages, can’t some culpability also be heaped on home buyers who took out loans that, if they were to really assess their finances, would clearly see they could not afford to repay?
With that said, Inside Job presents a compelling story of how Wall Street, or at least several of the large financial institutions typically associated with it, were not only aware of the budding crisis, but recklessly helped fuel it. Goldman Sachs, the movie shows, sold subprime mortgage securities even after its executives knew they were toxic. Knowing that AIG could be in serious financial jeopardy, the company began to quietly buy large amounts of insurance against the firm and shorted many of the bad financial products Goldman was selling to unsuspecting customers so that it could profit on the inevitable collapse.
Confronted with Goldman’s activities at the government hearings held to investigate the crisis, Lloyd Blankfein, the company’s chief executive, could only squirm to deflect his glaring culpability.
“What do you think about selling securities that your own people think are crap?” A senator asks. “Does that bother you?”
“Is that a hypothetical?” Blankfein responds.
“No this is real,” the senator snaps.
Meanwhile the film shows startlingly how infiltrated Washington and financial regulatory agencies are with former Wall Street executives and staff who have their hand in the Wall Street till. Larry Summers, a chief policy advisor to President Clinton and Obama, received $20 million the movie shows from a hedge fund that was involved in derivatives, one of the financial products that caused the crisis. Even academia, which publishes influential papers on the financial system and vouched for the safety of ultimately disastrous financial products, is on the Wall Street payroll. In one scene Charles Ferguson, the maker of the documentary, asks an academic if he could see the same conflict of interest between a doctor prescribing medication made by a company for which that doctor acts as a paid consultant and professors who write papers paid for by Wall Street. Like Blankfein, a stutter of half hearted logic and evasions ensues.
Wielding so much money and influence, Wall Street has, since the 1980s, rolled back financial regulations such as what leverage levels it could take on. Products like derivatives, which some knowledgeable financial experts the movie shows had long identified as potentially devastating magnifiers of loss in the event of a financial meltdown, were kept unregulated and allowed to proliferate. When the crisis hit, many financial firms, like Citigroup and Morgan Stanley and even healthier firms like Goldman and others would have likely joined Lehman Brothers in bankruptcy had it not been for various government emergency lending programs, which propped up the companies when credit came to a near freeze.
If these companies perpetrated their financial misdeeds with an understanding that they might have been destabilizing the entire system - as the movie suggests they did - why didn’t some element of self preservation blunt their activities? In essence, why didn’t the capitalist system modulate itself as proponents of deregulation like Alan Greenspan said it would? Did many Wall Street firms realize nefariously that they had essentially hijacked the economy and that government would hence have to come to their aid? In essence, did these firms realize early on they were too big to fail and that their friends in the regulatory system would bail them out both out of allegiance and necessity? With Goldman, the film notes, Tim Geithner, acting as the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and then later the Treasury Secretary, allowed that financial company to be repaid 100 cents on the dollar for insurance payouts it was owned by AIG after the government took over the insurance company. That Geithner didn't arrange a discounted payout brings into question both his judgement and his loyalty.
Lehman was allowed to collapse. But then the consequences of its downfall were what helped accelerate or even precipitate the crisis in the first place, so perhaps that firm would have been saved too if had been able to hold on until all of Wall Street was in the same boat.
One of the most infuriating points that the movie makes is that the perpetrators of the financial crisis were able to vastly build their personal wealth even as their companies and the economy eventually crumbled around them. That same detachment from the eventual downfall was evident on a systemic basis and was one of the chief moral hazards that drove the crisis. Firms that originated subprime mortgages and other debt for instance sold them off without a care whether those loans would actually be paid back. It was some one else’s problem. Ratings agencies like Arthur Anderson before them, gave a false sense of confidence by awarding highly risky bonds with high credit certification.
At one point in the film, Dick Fuld, the chief executive of Lehman, explains that his firm paid for its risk taking by going under. But Fuld, one of the most despicable culprits of the financial crisis, made about $500 million in compensation during his tenure. Angelo Mozilla, the head of the mortgage originator Countrywide, another culprit, made almost as much. Neither of these men have had to give back a penny in earnings. Essentially, the compensation structure on Wall Street incentivized immediate profit making without regard for the long term consequences of those strategies. Neither Mozilla nor Fuld will have to face any criminal charges for their role in the meltdown. If men like these had to face real punishment, even the hangman say, maybe then would we get to see if they would sell us that length of rope after all.